

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## Senator Douglas Urges Unity of Non-Soviet World

Our own safety depends upon keeping Western Europe and as much of Asia as possible non-Communist. It is now time to narrow our sights and to try to indicate what are some of the more immediate steps which should be taken to carry out such a general decision.

First, approve the principles of the Brussels agreement by congressional action, subject to a time-table under which each division of American troops sent abroad must be matched by a given number of European divisions, in a ratio of either  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 or  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 1, and speed up the terminal date at which we reach the maximum strength, so that it will not be the end of 1953 or even the end of 1952, but, if possible, the middle of 1952.

Second, prevent aggression from being rewarded, and hence do not permit Red China to be seated as a member of the United Nations. Institute a naval blockade of China to shut off supplies and force China to deplete Russia's resources. Bomb isolated Chinese supply dumps and power plants in Korea, although not the civilian population. I do not wish to see the civilian population of China bombed, because if we were to do so and if we killed large numbers of Chinese people, it would be likely to inflame all of China against us, and the Russians would try to turn the war into a race war of the yellow man against the white, which we must not permit to happen.

Third, make no deal in Korea in order to get out. Try to resist as long as possible. If we leave, let it be an honorable withdrawal under gunfire because of overwhelming odds. To withdraw otherwise would shake the confidence of non-Com-

munists and anti-Communists everywhere, and would enormously strengthen the forces of communism.

Fourth, try to promote democracy, land

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The fourth article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

reform, and an increase in production and living standards in all non-Communist countries, especially those threatened by Communist aggression. Do this not only for itself, but also so that the poor of these countries have something more to defend than is now the case, and hence may oppose communism more vigorously.

Let us range ourselves, not as white imperialists trying to take over those countries, but as a body of nations trying to resist aggression, so that the new nationalisms which are developing in Asia—the new nationalisms which at this time are trying to develop the freedoms we developed in the American Revolution—may come to fruition and may extend the benefits of a fuller life to all their people so that they may have a chance to be free from the imperialism of Soviet Russia and of Communist China.

Fifth, be ready to help with naval and air power if the Communists strike in Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, or the Near East. Get Britain and France to

make the preponderant contributions to the necessary land forces in order to compensate for their relative failure to help in the Korean struggle.

Sixth, try to get as good allies as we can, but have no squeamishness from now on about taking associates whose records may be somewhat soiled. Our civilization has the right to survive. It is infinitely superior to that of Russian communism. If we wait until we have perfect allies, we shall be very lonely. Let us try to bring Franco, Tito, and Chiang Kai-shek in on our side. They are not democrats, but they are anti-Communists. While they do not stand for freedom themselves, in resisting totalitarian communism they will be protecting our freedom. Try to help the constructive forces in Chiang Kai-shek's administration, and use his and our resources for a common end.

If spectators complain that we are not associating with the best people, let us remind them that the struggle is for survival, and that a defeat because of failure to use available non-Communist forces may not be as virtuous as they assume. Take pains to make the reasons for this action plain to the working people of Great Britain, France, and the West and to the free people in the East, and make it clear that in accepting the aid of dictators we do not subscribe to their anti-democratic ideas but instead are actively promoting the democratic faith.

Seventh, serve notice upon Russia and the world that the next act of aggression by a Communist satellite will be regarded by us as an aggressive move by Russia which will be punished by us to the full extent of our power. The Russians would

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like to bleed us white by a series of such moves by satellites for which they will then deny responsibility. If we and the rest of the world allow ourselves to be sucked in by this, it will be fatal. Instead of fighting off only the tentacles of the octopus, let us recognize that these tentacles are directed by a central intelligence. Let us serve notice, therefore, that at the next act of aggression by a satellite, we will reserve the right to strike at the eye of the octopus itself. This is much more likely to be a deterrent than a stimulant to aggression.

Eighth, although the hopes for settlement are but slender, keep open the avenues for honorable negotiation, and strive, without let-up in the mobilization of our defenses, for peace without any surrender of freedom or justice.

Ninth, let us tell the nations of the world our aims and intentions. They are honorable and we should make them known. Modesty is becoming in the case of individuals, but as a nation we must get across our ideas to the peoples of the world.

Let us determine that our civilization is not to fall and that the icecap of the police state shall not descend upon either us or Western culture. If that were to happen, then the liberties which we take for granted, as the air we breathe, would disappear. It would be hundreds of years,

perhaps many centuries, before that icecap would melt. During that time the Western civilization, of which we are proud, would largely disappear. I think that is a far worse thing to happen to the world than physical death itself.

Civilizations such as Greece and Rome have fallen in the past, and most profound students of history believe that they fell because men lost faith in themselves and failed to meet new challenges. The Communists believe that this is what will happen to us. They think the advance of history lies with them.

It lies within our power to prove them right or to prove them wrong. If we have faith in the essence of our society, namely, respect for the individual and a deep desire to improve human life, and if we translate such a faith into acts, we will survive. If we do not, we are likely to fall.

By withdrawing, we can allow the police state to take over Europe, Asia, and virtually all of the world. If this happens, we shall be hemmed in, and our own survival will be more doubtful. For such a confession of weakness would be contagious and would prevent the free world from rallying in unity. There would be a general rush of men and countries to save themselves. The result, in my judgment, would be disaster. War of course would be a certainty.

But if weakness is contagious, so also

is courage and determination. If we really resolve to resist aggressive communism, others will rally more fully to the cause and will join with us. We may not get the support of many whom we would like to have on our side. We will get the aid of others whom in calmer times we would not wish to have. But the free world will ultimately group around us. And this non-Communist world, if it will only unite, still holds the preponderance of power. For the moment, it is weak in military strength at its very center. But we can repair this. Freedom can win if we and all the free peoples are united. Such determined unity can perhaps still deter the aggressors from going further and give us peace. It is confessedly a slim hope, but it is the only hope for peace.

Even if—God forbid—open struggle comes, if we are determined to preserve the faith by which we live, we can rebuild much of the damage done and free ourselves and others from the fear of tyranny. In the words of Lincoln which are as appropriate for this crisis as for that of 90 years ago, "We can nobly win or meanly lose the last, best hope of man on earth." Let us resolve to win. Let us have faith and in that faith let us act.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

(Excerpted by special permission from a speech made in the United States Senate by Senator Paul H. Douglas, Democrat of Illinois, on Jan. 15, 1951.)

## ***Curb on President's Troop Powers Gains in Congress***

WASHINGTON—Since the initiation of the "great debate" about United States foreign policy by former President Herbert Hoover on December 20, President Truman has delegated to deputies the chief responsibility for giving to the public the official point of view about the policy he thinks the nation should follow:

### ***Eisenhower's Influence***

The principal deputy is General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who since December 19 has held an international office—supreme commander of the integrated defense forces being established in Europe by the North Atlantic treaty powers—but has in his homeland the special task of countering the argument that the United States should seek security by withdrawing from its commitment to take part in the defense of continental Europe.

This sharing of the presidential function has been in part successful. The statements by General Eisenhower on February 1 and 2 in support of carrying out our existing

commitments in Europe have strengthened the congressional disposition to oppose the fundamental revision of policy which Mr. Hoover advocated on December 20. Mr. Hoover re-enforced his position in an address of February 9, when he compared Europe to "quicksand," objected to the stationing of any American land armies there, and recommended that we rely on air and sea power to restrain Soviet expansionism. Meanwhile, General Eisenhower failed to check the sentiment in Congress to limit the size of the force which President Truman may assign to Europe. Thus the debate about foreign policy takes the form of a controversy about the relationship of the chief organs of the Federal government to one another. This controversy could lead eventually, by slow stages, to acceptance of the Hoover point of view. For if Congress succeeds now in restricting the authority of the President to send forces abroad, it could later forbid the President to assign any troops overseas. For the present, however,

the debate is not on the question of keeping land forces in Europe but on the question of the power of Congress to share with the President responsibility for defining the extent of that commitment.

President Truman has encouraged Chairman Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to sponsor a resolution which states simply that the Senate affirms the privilege of the President to send troops abroad without specifying the number. This resolution of approval conflicts with the opposite proposal by Senator Kenneth Wherry, Republican of Nebraska, that Congress should forbid the President to assign troops to Europe until he has specific congressional sanction for the act. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings on the issue framed by the Connally and Wherry resolutions, to begin on February 15. Not since the congressional controversy about lend-lease opened with hearings before the House and Senate committees just ten years ago this winter has the outcome of

a congressional debate about a major foreign policy problem been so uncertain as in this instance. The Foreign Relations Committee may accept the Connally approach. The Senate, however, may accept some modification of Senator Wherry's approach; in the form of a restriction on the size of the American force in Europe to a percentage of the forces raised by the Europeans themselves or to a percentage of the total American force.

The Wherry approach has been strengthened since General Eisenhower's statements by Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, and Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio. Senator McCarran, chairman of the special committee established by the Senate to check on the progress of the Marshall plan, countered General Eisenhower's effort to erase doubts about Europe's willingness to defend itself against invasion from the East by asserting that only Greece "has felt sufficient determination to defend itself, regardless of the action others might take, or to undertake an economic mobilization in its own interest without waiting for a master plan or assurances that its neighbors would do likewise." Senator Taft said in Chicago on February 10 that "the President should not be able to set up an international army [with] American troops without the approval of Congress.

Nor should he be able to do it without a definite binding agreement from the foreign nations as to the number of troops which they will put up. Such an agreement cannot be binding without action of Congress. . . . I suggest that not more than 10 per cent of [our] Air Force be stationed on the continent of Europe in the time of peace."

That formula would restrict the American force in Europe to not more than four divisions of ground troops (fewer than we now have stationed in Germany, Austria and Trieste) and at most six Air Force groups. While Senator Taft has been perfecting his proposals, the Administration has been negotiating for the creation of American air bases in Morocco (now approved by the French government) and for the establishment of other points of strength for our military use along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

### *Usefulness of Air Power*

The debate about presidential political authority has one facet which calls for debate about military policy. Former President Hoover on February 10 insisted that we should limit our defense of Europe to the use of air and sea forces, because "the air threat has been during four years the most powerful deterrent to any attack on

Western Europe" and "it is far more powerful than pouring American divisions into the reach of this Asiatic horde." Senator Taft said he approved the Hoover speech "in practically every respect." The question is open whether an air force can halt a forward movement over land by an advancing army.

Winston Churchill, Britain's wartime prime minister, stimulated public faith in the omnipotence of air power by his assertion in the spring of 1949 that the American possession of the atomic bomb—a feature of air power—was the principal deterrent to Soviet attack on Western Europe. The United States military establishment, however, is developing the American force on the assumption that sea and air power are inadequate deterrents to aggression. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, a Republican who disagrees with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Taft, declared on February 12 that "it would be the utmost of folly to depend upon just air and sea power, and I thought that everybody had learned that in Korea." Adequate public enlightenment on the merits of both sides in the political and military debate awaits a comprehensive statement by President Truman, whose office enables him to speak with more authority than his deputies.

BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Meat, Munitions and Manpower Trouble British Scene***

Prime Minister Clement Attlee made three speeches in January which to many Americans seemed to reveal some kind of schizophrenia in British foreign policy. On the one hand, he stated on January 23 that while Britain was willing to see Communist China labeled an aggressor in the United Nations, it was not willing to go further and support sanctions against Peiping. On the other hand, he told a Labor party meeting on January 27 that Russian imperialism more virulent than that of the Tsars made necessary a still greater rearmament effort. And on January 29 he outlined in the House of Commons the government's defense program—calling for the expenditure of £4.7 billion (\$13 billion), or 14 per cent of the national income, over three years.

His first speech was widely and roundly condemned in this country as flirting with appeasement. His second two speeches were praised for their realism. Yet it is doubtful whether the British see an inconsistency in clinging to the hope of a peaceful settlement in the Far East and

in recognizing the need for strengthening Western power. They have taken Secretary of State Dean Acheson's formula, negotiations from "situations of strength," to heart, and they believe and hope that the forging of armed might, coupled with the use of diplomacy, can maintain a peaceful, although troubled, world.

### ***British Strength***

From the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 until the Korean war, Britain moved toward a coordinated and strengthened Western defense system neither more slowly nor more quickly than its allies. While Britain showed reluctance to speed economic and political cooperation with continental countries, it was much more willing to make commitments for the joint defense of Western Europe through the North Atlantic pact and its machinery. World War II, in which Britain was the grim testing ground for guided missiles, proved that the island's defense began at least as far east as the Rhine.

Since the Korean conflict London has taken a number of steps to follow Washington's lead in rebuilding strength. On August 30 Mr. Attlee announced increases in service pay and extension of the draft period from 18 months to 2 years beginning October 1. Conscription, which has now been in effect more than ten years, extends to 18-year-olds.

Britain now expects to have more than a million men under arms by early summer. The regular army is being increased from seven and a half divisions to eleven and a half. The Territorial Army, the equivalent of our National Guard, is to be organized in an additional 12 divisions. Four of these are to be in a state of readiness so that they can go into action within 30 days. The army will also get 235,000 reservists, most of them World War II veterans, for 15 days training this summer. Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell has promised that the British forces in Germany will be increased from more than two divisions to four by July.

All this constitutes a notable effort for



a nation which is a sea and air power rather than a source of massive land armies. In one sense it is a weakness of Britain's strategic position that its troops are already spread over 19 countries, including Korea, Hong Kong, Malaya, Germany, Trieste and the Suez Canal Zone. On the other hand, as imperial-minded Britons are fond of pointing out, it is precisely because Britain has these far-flung commitments that it also is able to provide the bases that will be necessary for the global struggle now threatening. The diplomatic agility that held the imperial defense system together in the past is being severely tested today when Britain's relative power in the world has declined and its economic position has weakened. At the Commonwealth conference in January Britain canvassed Australia, New Zealand and South Africa for greater support in the Middle East with favorable results. But its greatest disappointment was failure to solve the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan in hopes that the two dominions would then be freed to take up defense responsibilities.

### British Morale

Added to the difficulties abroad are those at home. One of Britain's leading attributes as an ally in the postwar period has been its political stability, the absence of a significant internal Communist party and its people's awareness of the dangers of living in a world harboring strong totalitarian nations. Britain's morale and solidity in the cold war have measured up to their earlier reputation of Dunkirk and blitz days.

Since November Anglo-American differences over Communist China and the conduct of the campaign in Korea have led to some shrill expressions of anti-American sentiment. They have not, however, seriously threatened the Anglo-American alliance—still characterized as the "keystone" in the defense of the free world by Minister of State Kenneth Younger in his Commons speech of February 12.

And yet the stresses of prolonged austerity may slowly undermine Britain's morale and its effectiveness as an ally. What was probably the most serious postwar blow to the British people in their struggle for

economic survival was the cut in the meat ration which went into effect February 4, reducing the allotment per person to 8 pence worth a week, the lowest yet. The Labor government survived by slender margins votes of censure in Commons on February 7 and 8—one on the nationalization of steel and the other on the meat shortage. These two parliamentary successes appear to have safeguarded the continuance of the Labor government possibly until next autumn, but they do not assure the country a peaceful political year. The annual budget in April, when an attempt will be made to find the money for increased defense costs, is bound to be another gloomy landmark for the British taxpayer, already harder pressed than his American counterpart. Nineteen fifty-one has been widely advertised abroad as a festival year in Britain, but it will be understandable if the visitor does not find the natives dancing in the streets.

WILLIAM W. WADE

### Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BETHLEHEM, February 19, *The Role of Pakistan in the International Situation*, Mirza Osman Ali Baig

NEW YORK, February 19, *Britain and the Defense of the Free World*, Alistair Cooke

PHILADELPHIA, February 20, Model UN Assembly

PITTSBURGH, February 20, *Asia's Challenge to the West*, Col. M. Thomas Tchou, Preston Schoyer, Channing Liem

BOSTON, February 22, *Is Russia Weaker Than We Think?*, Alex Inkeles, W. H. Chamberlin

PROVIDENCE, February 22, *The Next Phase in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Vera M. Dean

ST. LOUIS, February 22, *Point Four*, Brooks Emeny

PHILADELPHIA, February 23, Student Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, Hon. Paul H. Douglas

ST. LOUIS, February 23, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

MINNEAPOLIS, February 26, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brook Hays, Walter Judd

NEW ORLEANS, February 26, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

DETROIT, February 27, *ECA*, John P. Dawson

BOSTON, March 1, *Has British Socialism Been a Success?*, James W. Wyers, Eric A. Wright

BUFFALO, March 1, *Germany*, Telford Taylor, Edward Litchfield

MILWAUKEE, March 1, Off-the-Record Luncheon, Joseph E. Johnson

SHREVEPORT, March 1, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

## News in the Making

**GERMANY'S FATE:** Now that a meeting of the three Western powers with Russia on the German question appears likely, the Germans' interest in their future political fate has sharpened. According to a special dispatch to *The New York Times* of February 13, leaders of the coalition government and Social Democratic opposition in West Germany have agreed to demand that the Council of Foreign Ministers authorize secret-ballot elections for an all-German parliament.

**EAST EUROPE EXILES PLAN FOR FUTURE:** In a ten-point declaration of independence made on February 11 in Philadelphia, exiled leaders of ten Eastern European countries called for liberation of their "captive" peoples from dictatorial Communist rule and outlined their ideas on domestic and international policies. Their program includes free elections under international supervision, basic freedoms, peasant ownership of land, a "just share" for workers in the profits earned by their industries and cooperation with the rest of the world.

**U.S.-BRITISH OIL ACCORD:** The long-smoldering Anglo-American dispute regarding London's restrictions on the sale of dollar oil to the sterling area was resolved on February 12. In return for the privilege of competing in sterling markets, the major American oil companies have agreed to reduce the dollar content of their oil to the average gross dollar content of oil produced by British companies. The eventual saving to Britain is expected to be about \$250 million a year.

**EMERGING WEST AFRICA:** The first parliamentary election in the history of the Gold Coast was held on February 8 and resulted in a victory for the Convention People's party, a group which stands for immediate self-government and whose leader is in jail serving a sentence for sedition. The party won 34 of the 38 elective seats in the 84-man parliament for the British West African colony. Kwame Nkrumah, the party's jailed leader, was among those who won seats. His supporters are seeking his immediate release.

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